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Abstract. After the Estonian Parliamentary Elections held in 2011, an
additional verification mechanism was integrated into the i-voting system
in order to resist corrupted voting devices, including the so called Stu-
dent’s Attack where a student practically showed that the voting system
is indeed not verifiable by developing several versions of malware capable
of blocking or even changing the vote. This mechanism gives voters the
opportunity to verify whether the vote they cast is stored in the cen-
tral system correctly. However, the verification phase ends by displaying
the cast vote in plain form on the verification device. In other words,
the device on which the verification is done learns the voter’s choice. In
this work, our aim is to investigate this verification phase in detail and
to point out that leaking the voter’s choice to the verification applica-
tion may harm the voter privacy. Additionally, when applied in a wide
range, this would even compromise the fairness and the overall secrecy
of the elections. In this respect, we propose an alternative verification
mechanism for the Estonian i-voting system to overcome this vulnera-
bility. Not only is the proposed mechanism secure and resistant against
corrupted verification devices, so does it successfully verify whether the
vote is correctly stored in the system. We also highlight that our pro-
posed mechanism brings only symmetric encryptions and hash functions
on the verification device, thereby mitigating these weaknesses in an
efficient way with a negligible cost. More concretely, it brings only m
additional symmetric key decryptions to the verification device, where
m denoting the number of candidates. Finally, we prove the security of
the proposed verification mechanism and compare the cost complexity
of the proposed method with that of the current mechanism.
Keywords: Internet Voting, Privacy, Verifiability, Trust
1 Introduction
Technology is frequently used in daily routines for governmental or banking
services via the internet using computers or smart devices. Among these services,
internet voting (i-voting) has the potential of increasing election participation,
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allowing voters, especially handicapped citizens or those citizens living abroad, to
cast a vote without going to polling stations on a specific day or time. However,
related security issues have not been taken into extensive consideration when
the users install applications onto their devices. In particular, by not paying
attention to the permissions given to the applications, users turn their smart
devices into potential targets for malicious malware that may be used to obtain
critical information about users [6].
Estonian i-voting protocol with its verification mechanism present an inter-
esting case because it avoids the additional pre- and post-channels as seen in
the Norwegian protocol, in which the verification is performed via smart de-
vices [12, 20]. Since 2005 Estonian i-voting system is still being used and the
number of i-voters increases in every election. In 2005 local election trial, while
only 1.9% of all votes were cast using the i-voting system, more specifically, 5.5%,
14.7%, 15.8%, 24.3%, 21.2%, 31.3% and 30.5% of votes were cast using the i-
voting system in the upheld elections successively [33]. These statistics show
that the increasing number of citizens prefer to use i-voting system. Accord-
ingly, security concerns related the i-voting system should be considered more
seriously.
The i-voting system aims to be at least as secure as traditional paper ballots,
meaning that i-voting should meet both cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast
requirements [7, 8]. As mentioned in [18, 21], client-side weaknesses were expe-
rienced in both the cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast mechanisms during
Estonia’s 2011 parliamentary elections, so called Student’s Attack. Therefore, af-
ter the 2011 election, a verification mechanism was added to the system that
gives voters the opportunity to verify the vote stored in the system via a smart
device with a camera and internet connection. The verification mechanism pilot
was first tested in the 2013 local elections and then used in the European Par-
liament Elections in 2014, and the Parliamentary Elections in 2015. Although
using an application on a smart device for voting verification solves the aimed
security weaknesses, it may bring with it additional problems related not only
to the voter privacy, but also to the secrecy of election results.
1.1 Contributions
In this work, we point out an important privacy issue in the verification mecha-
nism of the Estonian i-voting system. The motivation of our attack comes from
the fact that all voter details including the real vote are displayed by the verifica-
tion device. We stress that if the smart device running the verification application
is corrupted, then vote privacy can be easily compromised by sniffing the process
on the verification device of which the voter is most probably the owner. In the
post-Snowden world, although there is a growing awareness and concern about
security, privacy and integrity of data on our mobile devices, there is still con-
siderable number of mobile users who install mobile applications without paying
attention to their potential security or privacy issues. Therefore, assuming the
corruption of a smart device is relevant due to the huge number of increase in
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malwares during the last years [22–25,27–31]. Hence, it is possible for an adver-
sary to acquire an IMEI number and other private information, such as location,
contacts, phone number, emails, and photos from smart devices including voting
details, thereby compromises the voters’ privacy.
The goal of this paper is to mitigate the described privacy leakage of the
Estonian i-voting verification mechanism. In this respect, we propose a new,
privacy-preserving, and an efficient verification mechanism even if a corrupted
verification device is used. Our proposal is quite practical since only a few addi-
tional symmetric encryptions on the verification device is performed. Secondly,
the secrecy of the election results may also be violated within a wide range
attacks. Specifically, an attacker may obtain information about the partial re-
sults of the election before it has ended [21]. In this work, however, our updated
verification mechanism ensures the same security level without leaking any in-
formation about the vote.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related works are discussed in
the following section. The necessary preliminaries and underlying cryptographic
mechanisms are explained in Section 3. The current Estonian i-voting system
along with its components, security and threat models are explained in Section
4. A new potential privacy issue, the proposed voting protocol, and its security
model are given in Section 5. The security analysis of the proposed system is
presented in Section 6. Section 7 compares the complexities of Estonian system
with our proposed system. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Previous Work
In this section, we will give a brief overview of related work, focusing on only
internet voting schemes. After the 2011 elections in Estonia, Heiberg et al. pub-
lished a paper discussing new attacks and weaknesses resulting from client and
server side weaknesses namely Student’s Attack [14, 15, 18, 21]. The designers of
the Estonian i-voting system improved it by adding a verification mechanism.
Like in the Norwegian i-voting scheme, using SMS services as a post channel was
a possible solution; however, not all citizens may register their mobile numbers.
Furthermore, the post channel mechanism was not only rather expensive, it also
had various problems, as already seen in the Norwegian election system [10,12].
After a period of research and analysis, it was agreed that an individual verifica-
tion mechanism using smart devices without requiring any personal information
would be the most suitable verification channel for the Estonian i-voting sys-
tem [21]. It also well-known that the Helios system is end-2-end verifiable which
is not sufficient for secure elections since it does not prevent attacks from both
corrupted client and servers [2, 13,16,17].
The designers of the Estonian i-voting system claim that it was as reliable
and secure as the conventional election [12,32]. Contrary to their security claims,
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in [20], Springall et al. reported that the system is plagued by serious procedural
and architectural weaknesses enabling client-side attacks that skew the results of
the election undetectably bypassing the ID card system and smart device verifi-
cation mechanism. Additionally, it is claimed that there are several inadequate
procedural controls, lax operational security, insufficient transparency and sev-
eral vulnerabilities in the published code. Moreover, in the same work, Springall
et al. implemented a mock election in which they experienced both client and
server side attacks. In responses the authors presented their recommendations
on how to eliminate inadequate procedural controls and lax operational security
weaknesses. In [11], Heiberg et al. researched ways to eliminate transparency
weaknesses using an auditing mechanism.
After the NSA whistle-blowing revelations from Edward Snowden it is not
easy to guess that the future brings more security and privacy risks for mobile
devices [29–31]. For example, users can be fooled into installing malicious appli-
cations on their devices or to grant unauthorized remote access [22–25, 27–31].
Hence, an adversary can easily identify the owner of the smart device via pri-
vate information, such as one’s IMEI number, location, contacts, phone number,
emails, and photos. More specifically, IMEI numbers might also be required to
be recorded into a central system beforehand which are used to identify and au-
thenticate the mobile device whenever there is a connection request to a carrier.
Those IMEI numbers, which are not recorded into the system, can be banned
from communicating (e.g., [26]). For these reasons, one should never be able to
obtain any information about the intention of a voter from the voting details on
the verification device .
3 Preliminaries
In the next section, we will present the general setup and symbols needed to
presenting our protocol.
Underlying Cryptosystem. Denote a symmetric key encryption process as
Esym = SymEnck(M) and decryption as M = SymDeck(Esym), where k is a secret
key and M is a plaintext to be encrypted. We also denote the hashing of a mes-
sage M as H(M), where M is a message and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t. AES-256 and
SHA3-256 (where t = 256) can be utilized for symmetric encryption and hash
function, respectively [3, 4].
The underlying public key encryption scheme is semantically secure 1 (e.g.,
Paillier [35], and ElGamal [34]). An election specific public and private key pair
(pkS , skS) is generated by the servers of the National Electoral Committee (NEC)
in a k of n threshold manner. In other words, it is generated by the cooperation of
n independent parties and it is not possible to regenerate the key pair if at least
k of them do not cooperate. Furthermore, pkS is mounted to voter applications
1 Note that semantically secure cryptographic algorithms are basically randomized
encryptions meaning that encryption of the same votes is uniformly indistinguishable
from each other.
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VoterApp. Similarly, (pkV , skV) denotes a public and private key pair of a user
V. Easym = AsymEncpkV (M) denotes an encryption of a message M using the
public key of the voter V. Similarly, SignskV (M) denotes the signature of a userV on a message M using the private key of V.
4 The Estonian Internet Voting Protocol and its Security
Analysis
4.1 Components of the System
The Estonian i-voting mechanism is composed of three main parts: (1) client-
side applications (a voter application VoterApp and a verification application
VerifApp), (2) a Central System, and (3) Auditing and Counting processes.
A VoterApp is performed by the citizens eligible to vote via their ID cards.
VoterApp is already developed and published by NEC, and should be installed
beforehand. VerifApp should be installed on a smart device. Note that VerifApp
can be developed by any parties, including NEC, political parties, or an open
source community. The Central System has three main servers for forwarding,
storing and counting phases under NEC responsibility. The Vote Forwarding
Server (VFS) is the server that the client-side applications authenticate, send
signed and encrypted votes, and obtain the required data for both the voting
and the verification stages. The Vote Storage Server (VSS) stores the signed
encrypted votes during the voting period. At the end of the election, it removes
double votes, cancels ineligible voters, and prepares the votes to be tallied by
anonymizing the encrypted votes via a mixnet mechanism (e.g., [5]).
Separated from the rest of the system by an air gap, the Vote Counting Server
tallies the anonymized votes and computes the election results. During all these
processes, the auditing mechanisms save logs of the Central System events in
order to resolve independent auditors’ disputes and complaints.
4.2 The Estonian I-Voting Protocol
For simplicity of describing the voting protocol, we divide it into two phases: the
voting phase and the verification phase. The voting phase begins by VoterApp
authenticating VFS via a TLS connection. A voter V receives the related can-
didate list CL = {c1, · · · , cm} where ci’s are candidates’ unique identity values
and m denotes the number of candidates. Next, the voter V chooses a candi-
date c ∈ CL to cast the vote. VoterApp generates a signed and encrypted vote
SignEncVote = SignskV (Easym) where Easym = AsymEncpkS (c, r) and r ∈R {0, 1}κ
is a random number, κ ∈ N. Next, VoterApp sends SignEncVote to VFS, and then
receives a vote reference voteref which is a receipt to be used in the verification
phase.
During the verification phase, VerifApp receives r and voteref from VoterApp,
request the related data from VFS by the voteref, and computes the vote. Finally,
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VerifApp shows the recorded vote on the screen. If the voter confirms the cor-
rectness of the cast vote then the voting procedure ends successfully, otherwise,
the voter V puts an alarm.
Voting Stage:
1. A voter V: Authenticates to VFS through VoterApp using a national ID Card.
2. VFS: Sends CL = {c1, . . . , cm} to VoterApp where m is the number of can-
didates.
3. V: Chooses c from CL
4. VoterApp:
(a) Generates a random number r.
(b) Encrypts c and r by pkS , Easym = AsymEncpkS (c, r).
(c) Signs Easym by skV , i.e. SignEncVote = SignskV (Easym) .
(d) Sends SignEncVote to VFS.
5. VFS:
(a) Stores SignEncVote.
(b) Generates voteref.
(c) Sends voteref to VoterApp.
Verification Stage: Note that the verification stage is optional and used only
to ensure whether the vote has been correctly stored in VFS. It is also important
to note that for security purposes, VerifApp and VoterApp should not be installed
on the same device. Additionally, it should be noted that VerifApp scans the QR
code by camera instead of obtaining it via an internet connection.
Fig. 1. Verification stage of the Estonian i-voting protocol
1. (a) VoterApp: Generates a QR code including r and voteref and show on the
screen.
Estonian Voting Verification Mechanism Revisited 7
(b) VerifApp: Scans QR code by camera.
2. VerifApp: Sends voteref to VFS.
3. VFS: Sends Easym and CL to VerifApp.
4. VerifApp:
(a) Computes Ejasym = AsymEncpkS (cj , r) for all j = 1, · · · ,m.
(b) Finds ` such that Easym
?
= E`asym for some ` ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
(c) Shows c` on the screen.
5. V: Checks c` ?= c.
(a) If c` = c, the vote is received and stored VFS without any modification.
(b) Else, V puts an alarm (which basically shows that malware is present).
4.3 Security Model of the Estonian I-Voting Protocol
A security analysis of the current i-voting system of Estonia is discussed in de-
tail in [20,21] which are briefly mentioned in attack scenarios. Estonian i-voting
security model assumes that either VoterApp or the device that runs VoterApp is
malicious. We note that the assumptions VerifApp and VFS collude maliciously
or VerifApp and VoterApp collude maliciously are not realistic since the duty of
VerifApp is to independently check the correctness of VFS and VoterApp. Further-
more, as noted in [8], limited number of corrupted voters’ devices are accepted
as a reasonable risk.
Attack Scenarios. The main attack scenarios are about ballot integrity, the
reliability of the voting system, and coercion resistance.
– Manipulation Attacks. Manipulation attacks consist of modifications to
a vote without the knowledge of the voter V. These attacks are aimed to
change the vote to either a predetermined or a random candidate. There are
basically two variants of manipulation attacks:
• Student’s Attack. In Estonia’s 2011 parliamentary elections, the Student’s
Attack exposed that neither ballot integrity and secrecy in the election
was guaranteed [18]. The attack is based on installing a malware to
the device that runs on VoterApp. This malware is designed so that it
undermines VoterApp and while the vote is being cast, it silently diverts
or cancels the intended vote. At first, this attack was not considered as a
thread (see [18,20]). But, after, it became a real and efficient attack [18].
So that, a verification mechanism is integrated into the system [21].
• Ghost Click Attack. A malicious software that runs on the same device
as VoterApp can obtain the PIN code of the ID card during the voting
process. When the ID card is reinserted, the malware may re-vote silently
without being detected [20]. Although this is an interesting attack, it is
not included in the scope of this work.
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– Reliability Issues. By decreasing voters’ confidence in the i-voting system,
an election can be held questionable without there being any violation to vote
secrecy. Therefore, not only an effective verification mechanism must be set
up to prevent such attacks, but also, citizens should be well informed about
the process and security concerns about the system [8]. In fact, fairness and
the secrecy of the elections should be satisfied, that is in any paper based
or electronic voting scheme, the election’s partial or total results can not be
revealed before the tallying process.
– Coercion Attacks. An i-voting system must prevent a voter from being
able to prove to a coercer how he voted. Therefore, the system should provide
receipt-freeness or coercion resistance. Allowing vote updates (i.e., re-voting)
is the countermeasure to prevent such attacks.
Threat Model.
– Malicious VFS. In this case, there is a full privacy leakage where VFS may
leak all stored information as a result of potential Insider Attacks [20]. As a
countermeasure, auditing mechanisms with independent auditors can verify
the computations of VFS [11].
– Malicious VoterApp and its adversarial environment. During the prepa-
ration of signed encrypted vote, a malicious VoterApp can change the voter’s
intention c ∈ CL by c∗ ∈ CL where c 6= c∗ and then sends encrypted form of
c∗ instead of c. During the verification, VerifApp will reveal that the ballot
does not reflect the voter’s own will as intended and puts an alarm. The
voter V re-votes again from another device. Note that integrity of the stored
data in VFS is ensured after successful verification. Therefore, manipulating
the vote using a malicious VoterApp is not possible.
– Malicious VerifApp and its adversarial environment: It is possible to
sniff data from a smart device using any malicious application installed on
the device [22–25,27–31]. Leaking verified votes from the smart devices gives
an opportunity to get some idea about the election results before the elec-
tion ended. This attack violates one of the important limitation ”secrecy of
election results” of the Estonian i-voting system. Another attack based on
the leakage is that using a device’s IMEI number allows one to match the
vote with the voter V. In other words, the link between the vote and the
voter V is revealed. The attack disrupts the privacy of V which is one of the
main limitation of the Estonian i-voting system. Note that, the candidate
choice of a voter represents the voter’s political view. Therefore, when the
voter’s intention revealed, there is no way to recover. In other words, it is
not possible to choose another candidate and vote again. More details about
the attacks are given in 5.1.
In the next section, we will show that there is a practical and realistic attack
that may become a real issue.
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5 A New Potential Privacy Issue in the Estonian
Verification Protocol and Our Improved Verification
System
5.1 A Vote Privacy Issue in the Estonian Verification Mechanism
Recall that VerifApp is integrated into the i-voting system to be resistant against
Student’s Attack. VerifApp can be freely developed by NEC, by an open source
community or even by one who is able to write her own verification software while
VoterApp is developed only by NEC. In contrast, most citizens cannot develop or
control the trustability of VerifApp even it is downloaded from a known source.
Therefore, it is not realistic to assume that VerifApp is honest. The Estonian
i-voting system is designed in this manner and VerifApp explicitly outputs the
voters’ intention in plain form.
Even if VerifApp itself were to work properly, any malicious application run-
ning on the same device may sneak into the processes in an attempt to monitor
inputs and outputs. Therefore, it would be sufficient to have any privileged ap-
plication running on the same device [22–25, 27–31]. As soon as an adversary
manages to install such a privileged application, the only thing that needs to be
done is to grab a screen shot of the device while VerifApp displays the output
to the voter V. After that, the cast vote will also be known by the adversary.
Furthermore, since IMEI numbers and other private information (e.g, contacts,
phone number, location, emails, photos) can be obtained by a malicious appli-
cation loaded on the verification device, an adversary can obtain V’s identity.
Hence, privacy of V can be easily compromised. We highlight that this privacy
issue may lead to coercion or vote buying (e.g., an adversary can force voters
to install a malicious application on their smart devices for later check the their
actual votes).
When considered on the individual level, this attack causes privacy leakage.
On the other hand, when applied over a wide range by sniffing the plain votes
from the VerifApps without trying to find the related identity information, this
attack may also promise the reliability and, more importantly, the secrecy of
the elections. Because, as explained in [9], in any election the results would not
be exposed before the counting process has been partially or totally completed.
Therefore, the possibility of a corrupted verification device must be included
in the design criteria of the Estonian i-voting system, the current Estonian i-
voting system requires additional countermeasures to guard against this privacy
leakage.
In the next section, we offer a new protocol for the verification mechanism
which eliminates the trust to the verification device.
5.2 Our Enhanced Security Model
Our security model extends the Estonian scheme by eliminating the need to trust
the verification device on which VerifApp runs. Namely, the extended scheme
gives specific information to VerifApp on which the voted candidate should be
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recognized only by the voter V with her own eyes manually. Even VerifApp can
not learn the voted candidate using the data which is gathered from the network
or its outputs by VerifApp. More formally, the probability of correctly guessing
V’s intention using the information given by VerifApp’s inputs and outputs should
be the same as the conditional probability of guessing V’s intention randomly.
We stress that using a mobile device to verify the vote makes the Estonian i-
voting scheme vulnerable as in the original system because VerifApp outputs V’s
intention explicitly. In order to overcome this vulnerability, each candidate will
be displayed on the screen with a verification parameter and to let V checks
these results with her own eyes using the parameters and decides whether the
correct parameter and the candidate is matched.
5.3 Our Verification Mechanism
We are now ready to describe our proposal. The actual flow of the protocol is
similar to the Estonian i-voting system. In order to make the verification phase
more resistant against the attacks described in Section 5.1, we introduce a new
parameter q that will only be known to VoterApp and VFS where the size of q is
the same as the output size of the hash function H. More concretely, V chooses q
as a verification parameter and securely sends it to VFS during the voting phase.
Furthermore, during the verification phase, VFS computes H(Easym) and uses it
as a symmetric key to encrypt q for transmitting Esym = SymEncH(Easym)(q) to
VerifApp. In order to let V check her vote, VerifApp will perform a number of
decryptions qi = SymDecH(Eiasym)(Esym), i = 1, · · · ,m depending on the number
of candidates. Hence, it outputs a list Q = {q1, · · · , qm} of possible verification
parameters with the corresponding candidates. Finally, the voter V will manually
check the output list on the VerifApp’s screen with her own eyes to learn the
given q during the voting phase on the position of the chosen candidate . The
verification phase ends successfully if q exists and its index is the same as the
index of the candidate chosen by the voter V in the list CL.
Here, the trick is to encrypt q with the hash of the encrypted vote as the
symmetric key (i.e., H(Easym)). In the verification phase, VerifApp tries all can-
didates in order to generate the possible keys (hash of the possible encrypted
votes). In order to complete the verification successfully, the index of the chosen
candidate and the index of q in Q should match. Otherwise, either an alarm
would be raised, or the voting procedure should be re-started, or the verification
phase should be run in another device. It should be noted that manually finding
the correct verification parameter with eyes is an important security measure so
as not to reveal a voter’s intention to VerifApp. If the chosen candidate is dis-
played in plain form as in the Estonian i-voting scheme, adversaries may obtain
a proof of their vote which may lead vote buying or coercion problems.
The voting and the verification phases are explained in detail below.
Voting Stage:
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1. A voter V: Authenticates to VFS through VoterApp using a national ID Card
2.
2. VFS: Sends CL = {c1, . . . , cm} to VoterApp where m is the number of can-
didates.
3. V: Chooses c from CL and 4 characters of random verification parame-
ter (composed of 4 bytes per character) which is a random value qright ∈R
{0, 1}32.
4. VoterApp:
(a) Generates a random number r ∈R {0, 1}κ and qleft ∈R {0, 1}224.
(b) Encrypts c and r by pkS , Easym = AsymEncpkS (c, r).
(c) Signs Easym by skV , SignEncVote = SignskV (Easym) .
(d) Sends SignEncVote and the value q = qleft||qright to VFS3.
5. VFS:
(a) Stores SignEncVote and q.
(b) Generates voteref.
(c) Sends voteref to V for verification phase.
Fig. 2. The voting phase of the proposed protocol
Verification Stage:
1. (a) VoterApp: Generates a QR code including r and voteref and show on the
screen.
(b) VerifApp: Scans the QR code by the camera.
2. VerifApp: Sends voteref to VFS.
3. VFS:
(a) Computes H(Easym).
(b) Encrypts Esym = SymEncH(Easym)(q).
2 Once the authentication (i.e, TLS) is complete, the TLS should encrypt all traffic
between VFS and VoterApp to ensure that no data is leaked and to prevent man-in-
the-middle attacks.
3 We note that q can also be encrypted (under the VFS public key) and signed by the
voter to ensure its source and correctness.
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(c) Sends the ordered m-tuple CL and Esym.
4. VerifApp:
(a) For each cj ∈ CL, j = 1, · · · ,m, computes;
i. Ejasym = AsymEncpkS (cj , r).
ii. the hash value H(Ejasym).
iii. qj = SymDecH(Ejasym)(Esym).
(b) Shows the ordered m-tuple Q = {q1, · · · , qm} on the screen.
5. V: Finds the indices of q ?= qα ∈ Q = {q1, · · · , qm} and c ?= cβ ∈ {c1, · · · , cm},
where α, β ∈ {1, · · · ,m} 4.
(a) Checks α
?
= β.
(b) If α = β, the vote is received and stored correctly in VFS.
(c) Else, V puts an alarm.
Fig. 3. The Verification phase of the proposed protocol
6 Security Analysis of Our Verification Mechanism
We next show the correctness and prove the security of our mechanism.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). The verification phase of the proposed protocol
ensures both the properties recorded-as-cast (the vote is stored in VFS) and cast-
as-intended (the vote reflects the intention of the voter).
4 As we described below in Section 7.1, for usability concerns, only the last 32-bit
integers qi’s in Q as 4 characters are viewed to the voter where i = 1, . . . ,m.
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Proof. During the verification phase, the VerifApp first obtains r and voteref from
VoterApp. Next, VerifApp requests the relevant data according to the voteref from
VFS. VFS responds with the ordered m-tuple candidate list CL = {c1, · · · , cm}
and Esym = SymEncH(Easym)(q). Now, suppose that the voter V votes for the can-
didate cβ ∈ CL where β ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. Then, VerifApp completes the verification
phase by computing Eiasym = AsymEncpkS (ci, r) for each ci ∈ CL and outputs
the list Q = {q1, · · · , qm} where qi = SymDecH(Eiasym)(Esym). Since the random
value of the underlying asymmetric encryption r is given to the VerifApp, Eiasym
becomes deterministic. Therefore, VerifApp computes the correct value q success-
fully. Finally, the voter V searches for q (i.e., the last four characters of q which
were shown on the screen of the voter computer) on the verification device and
finds the index β ∈ {1, · · · ,m} where qβ = q.
Therefore, this scheme guarantees that the ballot reflects the intention of the
V (i.e., it has been cast-as-intended) and is correctly stored in VFS (i.e., it has
been recorded-as-cast). uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Privacy against malicious VoterApp and its adversarial en-
vironment). Our verification mechanism described in Section 5.3 is secure
against malicious VoterApp or adversarial environment of VoterApp.
Proof. Suppose VoterApp (or its adversarial environment) cheats and tries to
send the vote for another predefined candidate. Below, we show that the voter
V can easily detect this adversarial action via VerifApp.
Suppose a malicious VoterApp tries to find the appropriate parameters to
mock the VerifApp by finding a value r∗ for the candidate c∗ 6= c ∈ CL satisfying
q′ = q′left||qright = SymDecH(E′asym)
where E′asym = AsymEncpkS (c
∗, r∗) and q = qleft||qright. Namely, a malicious Voter-
App can fool a voter by only showing the correct value qright which is in the
position of the chosen candidate c.
In our system, for usability concerns, a voter chooses only four characters dur-
ing the voting phase. However, a malicious VerifApp may guess r∗ in such a way
that q′ = q′left||qright = SymDecH(E′asym)(Esym) where E′asym = AsymEncpkS (c∗, r∗).
However, this probability is 1/m · 1232 (choose the correct candidate of the voter
and the corresponding value r∗). Because voting phase is independent for each
voter, this probability goes to negligible for only 3 voters (i.e., 1296 ).
In the most general case, if a voter chooses the full length of q, then the com-
putational cost of finding r∗ for certain c, r and c∗ such that AsymEncpkS (c
∗, r∗) =
AsymEncpkS (c, r) = Easym is infeasible because of the underlying encryption
scheme. An attacker may also simply guess q∗ which will be correct with prob-
ability at most 1
2k
where k is the length of q. uunionsq
Theorem 3 (Privacy against malicious VerifApp and its adversarial en-
vironment). Our verification mechanism described in Section 5.3 is secure
against malicious VerifApp or adversarial environment of the VerifApp and does
not leak any information about the V and her intention.
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Proof. For the verification phase, VerifApp receives the parameters voteref, r,
CL = {c1, · · · , cm}, and Esym. Additionally, it computes the listsQ = {q1, · · · , qm}
and {E1asym, · · · , Emasym} where m is the number of candidates. It can be easily
checked if the received parameters or the computed values reveal any informa-
tion about the V’s intention. Therefore, an attacker sniffing VerifApp can only
learn whether a voter already has checked her vote.
Note that VerifApp never learns which qj is the correct q since the V checks
the index of verification parameter, which reveals the intention of the V, by her
own eyes from the ordered list Q. Therefore, an attacker sniffing VerifApp should
guess the correct q with probability of 1m which is no more than guessing the
candidate randomly. Hence, VerifApp leaks no information about the choice of
the V. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Privacy against malicious VFS). Our verification mechanism
described in Section 5.3 is secure against a malicious VFS.
Proof. Our proposed verification mechanism uses the same voting phase with the
Estonian i-voting system. The only difference is our mechanism is to the random
verification parameter q which gives no information about the vote. Therefore,
the proof of the security of malicious VFS is exactly the same with the Estonian
scheme which is explained in [8]. uunionsq
7 Complexity and Usability Analysis
In Table 1, the complexity analysis of the proposed verification mechanism is
tabulated. The cost of ridding the privacy leakage in the verification phase using
symmetric key cryptography requires almost the same cost as the current Esto-
nian i-voting scheme, specifically 1 extra symmetric encryption for VFS and m
extra symmetric encryptions for VerifApp.
Table 1. Comparison of Vote Privacy and Computational Cost of the Verification
Mechanisms where SymEnc, AsymEnc, Sign denote symmetric, asymmetric encryptions
and digital signature.
Vote Privacy
VoterApp VFS VerifApp Against Corrupted
Verification Device
Estonian 1 AsymEnc ∅ m AsymEnc 7
Verification + 1 Sign
This Paper 1 AsymEnc 1 SymEnc m AsymEnc X
+ 1 Sign + m SymEnc
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7.1 Usability and Optimization Improvement for the Verification q
The size of q is important due to privacy and usability concerns. Firstly, because
VerifApp computes qi = SymDecH(Eiasym)(Esym), i = 1, · · · ,m and outputs the list
Q = {q1, · · · , qm}, where each qi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) must be random values of equal
size and there exists a β (1 ≤ β ≤ m) satisfying qβ = q. If the size does not
match, the intended can easily be detected. Furthermore, since Q is disclosed to
VerifApp, each of the qi’s must be indistinguishable in order to hide the intended
vote and provide vote privacy.
Table 2. Shortened verification parameter on the screen on the voter computer.
Position # 1 2 3 4 · · · 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32
q a B x Q · · · q K j E m A l Q
qright m A l Q
Note that, on the other side, it is not usable and impractical for a voter
to generate a random q of t-length bits. For example, if AES-256 and SHA3-
256 are used as the encryption function then the voter must also generate a
random q of size 256-bits. Therefore, instead of generating a random value q, we
proposed to generate q = qleft||qright where qleft ∈ {0, 1}224 is randomly generated
by VoterApp and qright ∈R {0, 1}32 is provided by the V. In this way, a voter
can easily compare the value q on VoterApp to the qi’s on VerifApp. Hence, the
protocol will run as defined in Section 5.3, but both VoterApp and VerifApp will
only display (for usability purposes) the last 32 bits of the verification parameters
of q and q1, · · · , qm. A voter has to confirm with her own eyes that qright (i.e.,
the last 32 bits as 4 printable characters) is equal to the last 32 bits of qβ exist
in Q.
Table 3. The original q and the respective qright verification values where cβ is the
intended vote.
ci qi 256-bits q qright
c1 q1 qxvsEgaKMXpwApGDsNnPaNhjTJYtqven qven
...
...
...
...
cβ qβ aBxQwSOckfrzdYuaDNcvtTIDqKjEmAlQ mAlQ
...
...
...
...
cm qm RatqPKvgtTAFectHpOeteDoPYKbTkApp kApp
As an illustration, we present a sample shortening operation in Table 2 for
the parameter q =“aBxQwSOckfrzdYuaDNcvtTIDqKjEmAlQ”. Let ` = 4 and
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the position numbers are chosen as 8-bit words at the positions 29, 30, 31 and
32. Then, qright is shown as ’mAlQ’ on the screen instead of whole q. In Table
3, Step 5 of the verification phase is presented as an example which shows the
values on VerifApp screen where ci is the i-th candidate and qi is the related
verification value for i = 1, · · · ,m.
8 Conclusion
Internet voting schemes are evolving and are already being practically used which
aim to guarantee at least the same security level offered by the classical paper
ballot voting systems. After the 2011 election in Estonia, a verification phase was
integrated into the Estonian system to check whether the vote has been correctly
recorded by avoiding possible attacks from malicious computers. However, this
phase eventually displays the cast vote in plain form to the verifier application
VerifApp which may cause a serious privacy weakness and may compromise the
fairness of the election. More concretely, during the verification phase of the
Estonian voting system, displaying the vote in its plain form certainly may vio-
late vote privacy. The problem comes from the fact that if the voter application
VoterApp running device is assumed to be compromised then the VerifApp run-
ning device should also be assumed to be compromised. More concretely, there
is no difference between trusting a device running the VoterApp and trusting a
device running the VerifApp.
In this paper, we first point out this potential privacy issue of the Estonian
verification mechanism in details. We further proposed a new and usable verifi-
cation mechanism that does not disclose any information about the vote neither
to the VerifApp nor to the device where the VerifApp runs. We show that our
proposed verification system is strong against the aforementioned privacy weak-
ness. As a future work, investigating a mechanism that resists the Ghost Click
Attack and does not rely on additional post-channel communication would be
interesting.
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